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ABSTRACT
This study expands the model of corporate governance to incorporate moderating effect of board diversity. It also 
investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and firm performance and how this 
relationship is moderated by the influence of board diversity. The data of the study, which were extracted from annual 
reports of the UK FTSE 350 firms, were treated statistically using OLS-moderating multiple regression analysis. The 
coefficients provide evidence that the proportion of outside directors, board size, board diversity are significantly 
positively related to operating performance (ROA). The empirical evidence also indicates that the moderating effect of 
board diversity strengthens the relationship between outside directors and operating performance as well as between 
board size and operating performance. By implication, the result suggests that Agency Theory must explicitly indicate 
that board diversity plays important moderating role in corporate governance. 
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on assets; United Kingdom
INTRODUCTION
The increasing cases of corporate scandal and failure in 
the recent past have encouraged greater media and public 
interest in corporate governance than ever before. The aim 
of corporate governance is to protect the shareholders from 
self–interest of the directors so that they can get fair return 
on their investment (Guli, Sajid, Razzaq & Afzal 2012; 
Fama 1980). However, with the prevalence of enormous 
cases of corporate scandal and failure, there is doubt 
whether the existing mechanisms of corporate governance 
effective. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) argued 
that there will be greater agency problem, where corporate 
governance mechanisms are weak. 
 From the theoretical perspective, the interest of 
the shareholders can be protected from self-seeking 
management through effective monitoring of the 
management via corporate governance structures like 
board of directors, board committees etc, or by providing 
the directors with incentive to align their interests with 
that of shareholders (Abdulrouf 2011; Fama & Jensen 
1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976). The empirical findings 
on how best the corporate governance mechanisms are 
to be structured to enhance corporate performance and 
serve the interest of shareholders using diverse theoretical 
views remain inconclusive (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman & 
Donahue 2007; Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton 2002). 
Combs et al. (2007) suggested that one possible reason 
for the ambiguous empirical results on the link between 
corporate governance structures and performance might 
be that some contingent factors moderate the relationship. 
Added to this, Arosa, Iturrade and Maseda (2010), 
Jackling and Johl (2009) and Nicholson and Kiel (2007) 
declared that no single theory can adequately explain the 
complexity of corporate governance structure and that 
integrating multiple theories provide better understanding 
of dynamism of corporate governance.
 In the recent past, the issue of corporate board diversity 
has attracted attention of policy makers and researchers 
(Davies 2011; Cartel Simkins & Simpson 2003; Kang, 
Cheng & Gray 2007). It is suggested that corporate board 
structured along demographic diversity, such as gender, 
age, ethnicity etc is efficient in its monitoring role, 
and protects the interest of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Kang et al. 2007; Ferreira 2010). Although 
the UK government has adopted board diversity as 
corporate governance practice from 2012, there is limited 
empirical evidence on the impact of board diversity on 
corporate performance. 
 In the light of this development, this study combines 
agency theory and stakeholder theory to advance the 
proposition that board diversity has interacting influence 
on corporate governance structures and operating 
performance. This study investigates the effects of board 
diversity on the relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors, board size as well as audit committee and 
operating performance to understand how board diversity 
would contribute to good corporate governance practice in 
UK and other countries. For this purpose, this study used 
sample of 126 of UK firms listed on FSTE 350 between 2009 
and 2011 with 371 year-observations. 
 The findings from this study contribute to the 
literature in a number of ways. First, the study provides 
evidence on the moderating role of board diversity on the 
relationship between outside directors, board size as well 
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as audit committee and corporate operating performance. 
The result indicates that board gender diversity plays 
significant moderating role in the relationship between 
outside directors and operating performance as well as 
between board size and operating performance. Our finding 
suggests that the presence of women on the corporate board 
contributes greatly to the role of the board in corporate 
governance, especially in monitoring and advisory role; 
and this enhances corporate operating performance. 
Secondly, the result on the moderating role of board 
diversity offers practical implication for why corporate 
board should compose directors from diverse background 
to increase the efficiency of the board in its monitoring 
role of protecting the interest of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders through enhanced corporate performance. 
Furthermore, the findings contribute to the existing body 
of research, by providing evidence showing that outside 
directors as well as board size has significant impact on 
operating performance. The remaining part of this paper 
is organized as follows: the second part reviews relevant 
literature while the third part documents the methods 
used in the study. The results and discussion as well as 
the conclusion of the study follow in the fourth and fifth 
parts, respectively.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
It is expected that the firms which complied with best 
corporate governance practices would perform well. It is 
widely understood that corporate governance structures 
influence corporate financial performance. In this case, 
performance may be either operating based performance 
or market based performance. As the case with this study, 
operating performance is commonly used in research 
studies (Bauwhede 2009). Operating performance reflects 
the impact of many factors including efficiency of the 
management and the success of monitoring and advisory 
role of the board and it remains the traditional indicator of 
corporate performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
Corporate board performs two important functions in 
corporate governance. The first is that it monitors the 
behaviour of the management to protect the interest of the 
shareholders (Cole, Daniel & Naveen 2008). In performing 
the monitoring role, the board is empowered to hire, 
reward, discipline and fire the executives (Bhagat & Bolton 
2008; Jensen & Meckling 1976). In addition, the board also 
serves as adviser to the executive (Fama & Jensen 1983; 
Lasfer 2006). By these roles, the success or failure of a 
company lies with the board (Adams, Hermalin & Weibach 
2008). Hence, the quality of the board composition has 
great impact on corporate performance. 
 The agency theorists suggest that board would be 
more effective in their monitoring function if outside 
directors dominate it (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Hermalin 
& Weisbach 2003). In line with this, Fama (1980) argued 
that outside directors are independent an they have power 
to safeguard their reputation as experts; hence, can be 
trusted to effectively monitor the executive. Similarly, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) contended that without 
monitoring role of the outside directors, the executive 
might abuse their position in securing their job and 
approving their remuneration package. 
 However, the rampant cases of corporate scandal and 
failure in recent times have cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of monitoring role of the board dominated by outside 
directors. For instance, the 11 of 14 board members of 
Enron were outside directors and more than 50% of 
WorldCom’s board were also outside directors (Rashid 
2010). Combs et al. (2007) declared that in practice 
outside directors largely depended on the executive 
and their independence is weakened because they are 
subjected to manipulation of the executive. Despite 
these shortcomings, scholars have suggested that board 
composition with outsiders is comparatively better than 
board without outsiders in protecting the interest of the 
shareholders and boost firms performance (Combs et 
al. 2007; Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, findings 
proving the relationship between outside directors and 
financial performance are varied. 
 In the UK, Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) using 
data on 311 firms for 1996, reported that proportion of 
independent outside directors is positively and significantly 
related to performance. However, the authors did control 
other endogenous factors that may have effect on 
performance in the analysis and besides, they used single 
period time lag (1996). Similarly, Muller (2014) with 
data on UK FTSE100 firms provided evidence suggesting 
that outside directors positively affected operating 
performance. On the contrary, Guest (2009) who used data 
on panel of 2,746 UK listed companies between 1981 and 
2002 reported that outside directors have negative impact 
on firm performance. 
 In other studies, Anderson and Reeb (2004), Jackling 
and Johl (2009), and Heenetigal and Armstrong (2011) 
reported significant positive relationship between outside 
directors and firm performance. In a more recent study, Liu, 
Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) also established positive 
association between outside directors and operating 
performance. However, Bhagat and Black (2002) which 
based their study on the data of 848 US firms for 1991, 
found no relationship between board composition and 
performance. Similar findings were reported in Hermalin 
and Weibach (2003), Rashid (2010), and Amran (2011). 
The preceding literature leads us to the hypothesis below: 
H1: Other things being equal, proportion of outside 
directors on board is significantly related to corporate 
operating performance. 
BOARD SIZE
The number of people that make up corporate board will 
determine how effective it discharges its responsibilities in 
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corporate governance. Although there is no optimum board 
size in practice, Jensen (1994) suggested that board should 
have maximum of 7 to 8 members. However, Bonne, Field, 
Karpoff and Raheja (2007) drawing from the views of 
other scholars, suggested that the size of corporate board is 
influenced by three factors. First, Bonne and his colleague 
were of the view that the size of board depends on the 
nature and complexity of operation of a firm. Secondly, 
the size of board may also be the outcome of negotiation 
between the corporate stakeholders particularly between 
the CEO and outside members. Furthermore, the board size 
may also reflect specific requirement of a firm’s business 
and information environment and in this case, the board 
size will be a trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
monitoring of the management (Bonne et al. 2007). The 
impact of these factors may result in a firm having large 
or small board size.
 Dependent resource theorists support large board size 
and they argue that large board will expose firms to great 
business connections and critical resources (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & John 1999). In addition, large board is likely 
to have members with diverse background, experiences 
and who possess great collection of information which 
may add value to the performance of the firm (Arosa et al. 
2010; Dalton et al. 1999; Combs et al. 2007). From agency 
theory perspective, Jensen (1994) declared that large board 
is less effective than small board. The author argued that 
as corporate board increases in size so will be associated 
with agency problems. 
 Evidence from empirical studies indicated that 
board size has influence on corporate performance. With 
sample of US firms, Yermack (1996) established negative 
association between board size and performance. Guest 
(2009) also reported similar result using UK firms. The 
study of Haniffa and Hudaiub (2006) also found negative 
pattern between board size and Tobin q using Malaysian 
firms. However, a study by Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) 
which used data on 700 Malaysian listed firms for the 
year 2007, indicated that board size is positively related to 
firm performance. By the same token, Dalton et al. (1999) 
showed positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance. Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff (2009) also 
established similar pattern using 75 listed Malaysian firms. 
On the basis of the preceding literature, the hypothesis 
below is formulated: 
H2: Other things being equal, board size is significantly 
correlated to corporate operating performance.
AUDIT COMMITTEE
The board of directors may establish committees to carry 
out some specific assignments in order to facilitate good 
corporate governance and enhance performance. Audit 
committee is one of such committees and it is highly 
regarded in corporate governance (Cadbury1992). The 
audit committee is critical to corporate accountability and 
by its responsibility, it enhances confidence in financial 
statements (Laing & Weir 1999). The committee monitors 
the preparation of financial statement by the directors 
and reviews significant judgments made in the financial 
statements. It also serves as a link between the corporate 
board and the external auditor on all matters relating to 
audits. In UK, the committee is expected to have at least 3 
members (2 in case of small company), of which 2 must 
be independent non-executive directors (FRC 2010).
 However, with increasing cases of corporate scandal 
in recent times, the effectiveness of the oversight 
responsibility of the committee is being questioned. In 
the case of Enron, it was reported that the failure of the 
audit committee contributed substantially to the collapse of 
the company (Solomon 2010). Nevertheless, Abdur Rouf 
(2011) declared that the role of the committee ensures the 
integrity of corporate financial report, which is critical to 
the implementation of corporate governance principle and 
improving firm performance. 
 Some studies have provided evidence on the 
connection between audit committee and firm performance. 
Using UK firms, Laing and Weir (1999) found out that 
the presence of audit committee has positive impact on 
corporate performance. In the same vein, Bouaziz (2012) 
who used Tunisian firms reported that audit committee 
has positive impact on financial performance. Similar 
result was found in the study of Kallamu and Saat (2015) 
on data from listed finance firms in Malaysia. However, 
with UK data, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir et 
al. (2002) found no evidence to support the relationship 
between audit committee and performance. Similarly, 
using data on Jordanian firms, Hamdan, Sarea and Reyad 
(2013) reported that audit committee has no effect on 
operating performance. Thus, this leads to the formation 
of the hypothesis below:
H3: Other things being equal, audit committee is 
significantly related to corporate operating 
performance.
BOARD DIVERSITY
In recent years, one issue that has attracted great attention 
in corporate governance is board diversity (Davies 2011; 
Cartel et al. 2003; Rhode & Packel 2010). Board diversity 
is broadly classified as demographic diversity (gender, 
race etc) and cognitive diversity (education, experience) 
but gender diversity is the focus of most research studies 
(Erahardt, Werbel & Shrader 2003; Kang et al. 2007).
 Although UK Corporate Governance Code encourages 
board diversity, the concern for the issue is heightened by 
the spate of corporate failure around the globe. As a result, 
the UK government constituted a committee chaired by 
Lord Davies on the issue in 2010 and the committee set a 
target for gender parity of least 25% in favour of women on 
FTSE 100 boards by 2015. However, Martin, Warren-Smith, 
Scott and Roper (2008) cautioned that if the rate of progress 
achieved between 2003 and 2005 is not improved upon, it 
would take UK the year 2225 to achieve gender balance on 
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her corporate boards. Nevertheless, evidence from Sealy and 
Vinnicombe (2012) showed that female directors on FTSE 
firms’ boards increased to 15% in 2012 from 12.2% in 2009. 
What benefits has board diversity on firm performance?
 Arguing from the microeconomic perspective, 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), Kang et al. (2007) and 
Ferreira (2010) stated that diversity of board is desirable 
because it will lead to greater knowledge base, creativity, 
innovation, increase discussion, cross-fertilization of 
ideas and enhances problem solving and decision making 
capacity of the board. They argued further that since 
women control the global consumer spending, diversity in 
favour of more women on the board may allow for greater 
market penetration because of greater access to information 
on market’s needs and preference. 
 From ethical point of view, Brammer, Millington and 
Pavelin (2007) argued that it is wrong for an individual to 
be excluded from position, which she is qualified to hold 
on the ground of gender. Other views in favour of board 
diversity are also expressed in the works of Cartel et al. 
(2003) and Marimuthu (2008). However, board diversity 
is not without cost. In summary, Dobbin and Jung (2011) 
declared that diversity in race and gender to some extent 
may cause conflict, hinder communication and interfere 
with cooperation among board members; thereby lowering 
performance.
 Despite the increasing calls for board diversity, 
research findings on the impact of board diversity on firm 
performance are varied. In the UK, based on sample of 17 
companies with women on their boards and 19 companies 
without women on their boards, Ryan and Haslam (2005) 
reported that during the period stock market decline, the 
companies with females on their boards were more likely 
to experience bad performance consistently than the 
companies that appoint males. However, the samples of 
the study were small for its finding to be generalised. 
 In US, the study of Cartel et al. (2003) used the data 
of 683 firms and found significant positive relationship 
between fraction of women on the board and performance. 
Catalyst (2004) which is most cited study on board 
diversity used data of 353 US firms for 1997-2000, 
reported connection between gender diversity and financial 
performance. However, this study did not use method 
which produced cause effect. Francoeur, Labelle and 
Sinaclair-Degage (2008) and Erahardt et al. (2003) reported 
positive relationship between the two variables. In other 
studies, Dobbin and Jung (2011) and Marimathu (2008) 
found negative relationship between board diversity and 
performance.
 However, following the inconclusive findings on the 
relationship between governance structure and corporate 
performance (example Dalton et al. 1998; Daily et al. 
2002 etc), we advance the proposition that board diversity 
influenced the relationship. We argue that the impact of 
outside directors, board size as well as audit committee 
on operating performance depend on diversity of the 
members. A more diverse board would have people from 
different backgrounds endowed with different knowledge, 
experience, and skill; and they are likely to make quality 
contribution to decision process and monitoring role of 
the board, which subsequently would have great impact 
on performance. Our argument for the moderating role of 
board diversity lends support to the Agency Theory and it 
is based on economic cause. From theoretical perspective, 
well diversified corporate governance structures will ensure 
better protection to the shareholders’ interest through 
effective monitoring of the behaviour of the CEO and other 
executive directors by people of diverse background and 
experiences. In this regard, the effect of board diversity 
through enhanced monitoring role of the board will cause 
firms to be economically prosperous; leading to greater 
profitability and thereby creating value to shareholders. 
This suggests that the effect of board diversity will 
positively strengthen the relationship between governance 
structure and corporate performance. Therefore, from the 
preceding literature, the following hypotheses are set out 
to test the direct and moderating effect of board diversity:
H4:  Other things being equal, board diversity is significantly 
related to corporate operating performance. 
H5:  Other things being equal, the effect of board diversity 
strengthens the relationship between outside directors 
and corporate operating performance. 
H6:  Other things being equal, the effect board diversity 
strengthens the relationship between board size and 
corporate operating performance. 
H7:  Other things being equal, the effect board diversity 
strengthens the relationship between audit committee 
and corporate operating performance. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLES AND DATA
The data used in this study were extracted from annual 
reports of firms listed on UK FTSE 350. The firms on 
FTSE 350 are from different segments of the market of 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 cutting across different sectors 
and industries. Given that the study covers period from 
2009-2011, the samples were chosen based on the 
population of 241 companies listed on the FTSE in 2009 
(London Stock Exchange 2009). These excluded financial 
institutions because these institutions are subjected to other 
regulations from the UK Financial Service Authority1 and 
these regulations would make comparison between them 
and other companies difficult. In selecting the samples, 
proportionate stratified sampling and simple random 
sampling techniques were used (see Table 1). 
 The proportionate stratified sampling technique was 
applied to categorise the sample size into 9-industry 
classifications. From each industry, simple random 
sampling technique was applied to select firms that 
represent the samples of the study. However, after deleting 
firms with incomplete data as well as accounting for 
outliers, the actual samples of this study were 126 firms 
with 371 firm-years observations.
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MODEL AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
In addition to ascertaining the relationship between dependent variable and independent variables, this study also 
determined the moderating effect of board diversity. For this purpose, there is consensus in the statistics literature that the 
appropriate statistical technique to assess the presence of moderating effects in the relationship between two variables is 
Ordinary Least Square-Moderated Multiple Regression (OLS-MMR) (Aguinis & Gotterdson 2010; Aiken & West 1991). 
The direct relationship between the internal corporate governance structures and operating performance was estimated 
using the model 1, while the interacting effects of board diversity on the relationship was estimated in model 2.
Operating Performance it = β0 + β1OUDit + β2BSIZEit+ β3AUCOMit + β4BDVit+ β5LogFMZit + β6DEBTit + 
   β7BMETit + β8BHSit+ β9LogMVEit+ β10LagROAit +β11INDSECTit +eit   1
Operating Performance it = β0 + β1OUDit + β2BSIZEit+ β3AUCOMit + β4BDVit+ β5LogFMZit + β6DEBTit + 
   β7BMETit + β8BHSit+ β9LogMVEit+ β10LagROAit + β111INDSECTit + 
   β12OUDit*BDVit + β13BSIZEit*BDVit. + β14AUDCOMit*BDIVit + eit.  2
 
Where: i = firm, t = time (that is 2009-2011), β
0 
is the intercept , β1 – β14 are coefficient and e is the error. Operating 
performance is proxy for return on assets (ROA), OUD for the proportion of outside directors on board, BSIZE for board 
size, AUCOM for audit committee, BDV is board diversity. While LogFMZ is firm size, DEBT for debt capital, BMET is 
board meeting, BSH is block shareholders, LogMVE for market value of equity, LagROA is prior year return on assets and 
INDSECT is for dummy variables representing each of eight industry classifications. Table 2 summarises the measurement 
of various variables. 
TABLE 1. Study’s population and sample size
Industry  Target Actual
Population
of Firms
Sample
Size
No of firm - 
Years
Sample 
Size
No of firm –
years
No % No % No % No %
Basic Materials
Consumers Goods
Consumers Services
Health Care
Industrials
Oil and Gas
Telecommunication
Technology
Utilities
19
26
65
12
64
22
5
18
10
12
16
41
7
40
14
3
11
6
7.88
10.79
26.97
4.98
26.57
9.13
2.07
7.47
4.14
36
48
123
21
120
42
9
33
18
8.00
10.67
27.33
4.67
26.67
9.33
2.00
7.33
4.00
4
15
39
7
38
7
1
10
5
3.17
11.90
30.95
5.56
30.16
5.56
0.79
7.94
3.97
12
44
117
21
112
18
3
30
14
3.23
11.86
31.54
5.66
30.19
4.85
0.81
8.09
3.77
Total 241 150 100.00 450 100.00 126 100.00 371 100.00
Source: Author compilation, 2012
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION
The descriptive statistics for each of the three years (2009- 
2011) as well as the pooled data for the entire firm with 
371 observations are presented in Table 3. The descriptive 
analysis on the operating performance shows the mean 
percentage of ROA increased progressively from 9.28% in 
2009 to 11.52% in 2011 with overall average of 10.59% 
for the 3 years. The improvement of ROA is an indication 
that UK listed companies had recovered from the effect of 
global financial meltdown and this represents a good sign 
of corporate governance. 
 With respect to the descriptive analysis of the 
continuous independent variables, Table 3 reveals that 
corporate board composed of an average of about 65% 
of outside directors (OUD) in each of the 3 years under 
review. Even though the result suggests that majority 
board members of UK companies are outsiders, the mean 
proportion of the outside directors is slightly below 2/3 
as recommended by UK Governance Code. Furthermore, 
Table 3 indicates that average board size (BSIZE) of 
listed companies in UK between 2009 and 2011 was 
10. On the average, this suggests that listed companies 
in UK maintained board size above between 7 and 8 as 
recommended in the literature (Jensen 1994). 
 On board diversity (BDV), the mean proportion of 
women on the boards improved gradually from about 8% in 
2009 to about 10% in 2011. The increase in the proportion 
of women on the corporate board in UK could be attributed 
to the awareness created among the stakeholders by the 
establishment of Dave’s committee on board diversity in 
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2010 before the principle of board diversity was enshrined 
in UK Corporate Governance Code in 2012. However, with 
less than 1% women on each board, this suggests that male 
totally dominated corporate decision making in the UK. 
 With reference to the control variables, Table 3 
indicates that the mean of natural logarithm of total assets 
representing firm size (FMZ) remains stable throughout 
the period under review at 8%. Surprisingly, the mean 
percentage of the debt ratio (DBT) dropped from about 
58% in 2009 to 56% in 2011. Generally, the debt ratio 
is more than 50% and this indicates that these firms are 
characterised by some degree of risk. However, this varies 
from industry to industry. 
 The descriptive analysis also indicates the mean 
number of board meetings (BMT) held by the samples to 
be approximately 9 in each of the 3 years under review 
while the average proportion of shareholders (BHS) having 
blockshareholding (that is 5% or more) dropped from about 
31% in 2009 to 10% in 2010, but increased to 28% in 2011. 
Furthermore, the mean of natural logarithm of market value 
of equity (MVE) remained stable at about 7% through the 
period under study and this suggests the sampled firms 
maintained stable growth.
 Table 4 presents inter-correlation between various 
variables of the study and the results indicate that the 
strength of correlation between most variables are weak; 
hence produced small effect (±.1) while association 
between other variables produced moderate effect (±.3) 
and high effect (±.5) respectively. For the independent and 
moderating variables, ROA is only negatively correlated to 
BSIZE (r = -.111) at 1% significance level. Similarly, for the 
control variables, ROA is also negatively associated with 
FMZ (r= -.257), BMT (r= -.156) and MVE (r= -.137) at 5 % 
significance level respectively.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Various tests were conducted to confirm whether the 
assumptions underlying OLS-MMR are complied with. 
The analysis of residual and plots of the studenised 
residuals against predicated value reveal considerable 
homoscedasticity and linearity in the data. Similarity, the 
results of P-P plot as well as kurtosis and skewness indicate 
that normality assumption was fairly upheld. However, one 
of the main limitations of OLS-MMR is that the presence 
of high correlation between variables (multicollinearity) 
may weaken the regression result and it may fail to detect 
moderating effect. To ensure robustness of the regression 
result, all the variables were centred2 as recommended by 
Aiken and West (1991). Accordingly, VIF and correlation 
indicate that multicollinearity did not pose problem to the 
analysis. 
 In using OLS-MMR, the dependent variable was 
regressed on the set of predictor variables (independent 
variables) in the first stage to obtain the main effect while 
in the second stage; dependent variable was regressed on 
the set of predictor variables, moderator and a cross product 
of the preceding term (the product of each independent 
TABLE 2. Measurement of operating performance and corporate governance structures
Variable Code Measurement
Dependent
 Operating performance ROA Profit before tax & interest scaled down by total assets and multiplied by100
Independent
 Outside directors
 
 Board Size
 Audit committee
OUD
BSIZE
AUCOM
The proportion of nonexecutive directors to the number of directors on the board 
each year 
Absolute number of directors on the board of a company each year.
Existence of the audit committee as defined by regulation, if yes it is scored one 
(1) and if no, the score is zero (0)
Moderator
 Board diversity BDV The proportion of women directors to the number of directors on the board of 
company each year.
Control
 Log Firm size
 Debt
 Board meeting
 Block shareholders
 
 Log Market value of equity
 
 Lag Return of assets
 
 Industry classifications
FMZ
DBT
BMET
BHS
MVE
ROA
INDSECT
Natural logarithm of the total assets of a company each year 
Total debt scaled down by total assets and multiple by 100
Absolute number of meeting held by board of directors each year 
The proportion of board members who have at least 5% interest in company’s 
shares to the number of directors on the board each year 
Natural logarithm of the outstanding shares multiplied by closing share price of 
a company each year 
Profit before tax & interest scaled down by total assets and multiplied by100 of 
the previous year
Each of the 8 sectors of the industry classifications was measured using dummy 
variable adopting consumers service as reference base.* 
* The 8 sectors are Basic materials (BMAT), Consumers goods (CONGOODS), Health care service (HCARES), Industrial sector (INDUS), Oil and gas (OIGA), 
Telecommunication (TELECOM), Technology (TECH), Utility (UTIL).
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables
Code  Variables
2009
Mean
Std Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
N = 123
2010
Mean
Std Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
N = 124
2011
Mean
Std Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
N = 124
2009-2011
Mean
Std Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
N = 371
Operating performance
ROA Return on assets (%) 9.281
9.530
.812
3.565
10.710
7.7146
1.175
3.572
11.522
7.916
1.646
6.937
10.507
8.451
1.060
4.469
Independent 
OUD Outside Directors (%) 64.829
12.020
-.278
-.179
64.205
11.704
-.228
.054
65.559
11.0456
-.402
-.407
64.865
11.578
-.301
-.195
BSIZE Board Size 9.829
2.673
.880
.999
9.532
2.558
.911
-838
10.000
2.613
1.072
1.222
9.787
2.615
.943
.983
Moderator
BDV Board Diversity (%) 8.302
8.258
.948
1.410
9.226
8.353
.413
-.772
10.109
8.527
.482
-.226
9.215
8.390
.602
.013
Control 
FMZ Log Firm Size 7.537
1.412
.131
-.391
7.628
1.400
.150
-.464
7.686
1.363
.226
-.450
7.617
1.390
.162
-.445
DBT Debt ratio (%) 58.986
25.330
.976
3.540
56.330
22.738
.577
1.192
56.070
23.012
.988
4.389
57.123
23.690
.871
3.105
BMT Board Meeting 9.114
3.137
1.911
6.946
8.589
2.735
1.845
6.515
8.750
2.784
1.605
5.275
8.817
2.891
1.810
6.354
BSH Block S/holder 30.781
23.476
1.151
1.708
10.223
4.308
-.835
1.113
28.514
19.116
.665
.049
30.184
22.101
.967
.949
MVE Log Mkt Value of Equity 7.158
1.342
.593
.572
7.458
1.333
.316
.245
7.463
1.295
.429
.259
7.360
1.327
.428
.268
ROA
t-1
Lag Return on assets (%) 11.557 10.734 11.556 10.519
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variable and moderator). Table 5 which documents the 
regression results indicates that the value of the F ratios 
which ranged 3.985 to 13.687 for the two models in each 
of the 3 years under review as well as the pooled data, is 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the models 
are statistically fit to predict the operating performance. 
With R2 ranging from .426 to .452 respectively for model 
1 and 2 of the pooled data, all the variables in each of 
these two models could only offer about 43% and 45% 
explanation of the variance in the dependent variable 
(ROA) respectively. However, the conservative explanation 
offered by adjusted R2 was at 40% and 42%, respectively. 
 On the contribution of individual variables in each 
model, Table 5 indicates that proportion of outside 
directors (OUD) was positively significantly related to 
operating performance (ROA) in model 2 of the pooled 
data, but not significant in the models in each period 
under study. This suggests that the interacting effect of 
board diversity strengthens the relationship between 
outside directors and ROA. This result supports H1 and 
is consistent with findings in Anderson and Reeb (2004), 
Jackling and Johl (2009), Heenetigala and Armstrong 
(2011), Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) which 
reported positive relationship between OUD and ROA. This 
finding is expected considering that descriptive statistics 
(see Table 3) provided evidence that majority (65%) of 
board members on FTSE 350 were OUD. This means that the 
OUDs brought on the board diverse skill and experience, 
which assisted in pushing up advisory and monitoring role 
of the board, which positively influenced the company’s 
operating performance. 
 This result supports the proposition of the Agency 
Theory, which suggests that board dominated by OUDs 
is likely to be efficient in its advisory and monitoring 
role and which in turn, will have impact on corporate 
performance. It is in recognition of the important role 
that OUDs dominated board plays in corporate governance 
particularly in corporate performance that as far back as 
1992 Cadbury Committee asked for formal inclusion of the 
appointment of OUDs on the board as part of UK Corporate 
Governance Code with further recommendation on this 
matter by other committees. 
  Similarly, board size (BSIZE) became significantly 
related to operating performance (ROA) on the inclusion 
of the interacting effect of board diversity in model 2 
under pooled data. This implies that large board size 
could be more efficient if it encompasses people of 
diverse background. Though the positive relationship 
between board size and operating performance indicated 
by regression coefficient contradict the proposition by 
the agency theory, the result is consistent with findings of 
some past studies which also reported positive relationship 
between the two variables. For instance, the study of 
Abidin et al. (2009) reported that board size has positive 
impact on financial performance. The same result was 
also found in a more recent investigation by Johl, Kaur 
and Cooper (2015). Thus, this result provides evidence in 
support of H2. However, the relationship between audit 
committee (AUCOM) and operating performance (ROA) is 
not significant in individual years except for model 1 of 
the pooled data when audit committee exerts significant 
positive impact on operating performance. This result 
supports H3 and agrees to the findings in studies of Laing 
and Weir (1999), Bouaziz (2012) and Kallamu and Saat 
(2015) which indicated that audit committee is significantly 
positively associated with financial performance. In 
addition, the board diversity (BDV) is found to be significant 
to operating performance (ROA) in model 2 in 2010 as 
well as for the pooled data. This result which indicates 
significant positive connection between BDV and ROA 
allows us to accept H4. The result corresponds to the 
findings in the studies of Cartel et al. (2003), Catalyst 
(2004), Francoeur et al. (2008) and Erahardt et al. (2003). 
Each of these studies provided evidence which suggests that 
board diversity positively influences financial performance. 
The evidence on the relationship between BDV and ROA 
reported in this study lends support to the argument by 
Davies (2011) that corporate board would perform better 
if membership is drawn from different spectrum of the 
society and background, particularly on gender. Similar 
TABLE 4. Correlation analysis
Code ROA OUD BSIZE BDV FMIZ DBT BMT BHS MVE ROA
t-1
ROA 1.000
OUD -.020 1.000
BSIZE -.111* .105* 1.000
BDV .016 .128* .190** 1.000
FMZ -.257** .312* .575** .296** 1.000
DBT -.065 .194* .169** .116* .133* 1.000
BMT -.156** .009 -.137** -.124* -.079 .019 1.000
BHS -.008 -.086 -.552** -.143** -.490** -.143** .127* 1.000
MVE -.137** .299** .313** .254** .757** .022 -.191** -.440** 1.000
ROA
t-1
.064 .150** -.014 -.108* .080 -.113* .049 -.069 .085 1.000
Significant levels are:* P<.01, ** P<.05 
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view is held by other scholars (Ferreira 2010; Kang et al. 
2007 etc.). Furthermore, the finding of this study provides 
justification for recent UK policy to encourage firms listed 
on the FTSE 350 to have more women on their boards by 
2015 (Davies 2011) as well as activists who are agitating 
for great female representation on corporate boards 
worldwide. Therefore, positive relationship between the 
board diversity and financial performance as reported in 
this study is not surprising; considering the fact that diverse 
boards particularly in terms of gender is likely to improve 
decision making process and strategies of a firm through 
great and quality input. Diverse knowledge, experience, 
skill, creativity and innovation are to be brought to the 
board. 
 The results on the control variables indicate that 
company size (FMZ) which is represented by natural 
logarithm of total assets has significant negative association 
with operating performance (ROA) for all the three years 
and the pooled data. This suggests that as company 
becomes large in size it becomes complex to control. 
Hence, it becomes inefficient and this would result in lower 
financial performance. Similarly, board meeting (BMT) 
was found to have significant negative relationship with 
ROA in 2010. The regression result also provides evidence 
that control variable natural logarithm of market value of 
equity (MVE) is positively significant related to operating 
performance in every year under reviewed as well as for the 
pooled data. This result is not unexpected because market 
value of equity and operating performance interrelated; 
better market value of equity will positively influence 
operating performance and vice versa. In addition, on 
industry classification, basic materials (BMAT) sector was 
found to be positively related to operating performance 
at significant level in 2010 and 2011 as well as for the 
pooled data compared to industrial sector (INDU) which 
was positively significant in 2009 and for the pooled data. 
The health care sector (HCARES) was only significant in 
model 1 for the pooled data while its counterpart in the 
utility sector (UTIL) was found to be positively significant 
in 2009 and for the pooled data. Unlike other sectors, oil 
and gas sector (OILGAS) was found to be negatively related 
to operating performance at significant level in 2010 as 
well as in model 1 for the pooled data; but the technology 
sector (TECH) was negatively significant in 2010 and 2011. 
This suggests that increase in the activities in these sectors 
might have effect on operating performance. 
  The regression result also suggests that the inclusion 
of board diversity in the regression model as a moderator 
slightly increase the adjusted R2 of all the years and the 
pooled data. This is an indication that the predictive 
capacity of model 2 was strengthened in the presence of 
moderating effect of board diversity. This result suggests 
that the moderating effect of board diversity has great 
impact on operating performance and it is an indication 
that operating performance reacts favourably to inclusion 
of women on the boards. 
 For the moderating effect, the result indicates that 
board diversity (BDV) interacted positively with outside 
directors (OUDs) to influence operating performance (ROA) 
at significant level for every year and for the pooled data 
except for 2010. Thus, the result provides support for the 
acceptance of H5. This finding which came in the direction 
expected, suggests that outside directors from diverse 
gender background have positive impact on operating 
performance. There are a number of possible explanations 
for this finding. First, outside directors from diverse gender 
encourage directors to bring into a firm better and creative 
approach which may improve the ability and capacity of 
the board to monitor and control the management. The 
improvement in the monitoring and controlling function 
of the board resulting from the effect of gender diversity 
of outside directors will undoubtedly enhance corporate 
performance and add value to shareholders. Added to 
this, diverse directors from outside provide a firm more 
connections with the external environment and this means 
greater access to market and resources which will translate 
into greater financial performance. Hence, the effect 
of board diversity strengthens the relationship between 
outside directors and corporate performance. 
 Similar to the result on outside directors, board 
diversity (BDV) also positively significantly moderated 
the relationship between board size (BSIZE) and ROA in 
2009 and 2011 as well as for the pooled data. Hence, this 
statistical result support H6 and this suggests that board 
size composing people of different gender background 
is likely to improve firms’ operating performance. To be 
specific, these results show that the presence of women 
on the board either as executive or nonexecutive directors 
exerts influence which tremendously improved operating 
performance (ROA). These findings came in the direction 
and statistical significance expected suggesting that the 
presence of women on the board increases the board 
productivity which strengthened relationship between 
board size and operating performance. This result is not 
surprising because board size that is well diversified 
along gender basis will certainly attract different talented 
individuals with greater knowledge base, creativity, 
innovation and ability to increase discussion, cross-fertilise 
ideas and enhances problem solving and decision making 
capacity of the board. 
 These unique characteristics from a diverse board 
size will promote corporate performance. Furthermore, 
board size that is diverse in favour of gender is expected 
to increase economic prosperity through greater market 
penetration resulting from greater access to information 
on market’s needs and preference. This economic benefit 
is made possible by the involvement of women either 
as executive or nonexecutive directors on the board. By 
their nature, women control the global consumer spending 
and as a result, they are more knowledgeable about the 
markets particularly in the industries with feminine content 
and products. Market information is useful to firm’s 
competitive strategy. The results of the effect of board 
diversity on outside directors and board size reaffirmed 
the finding on the direct relationship between outside 
directors and ROA as well as board size and ROA. This 
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TABLE 5. Cross sectional moderated OLS regression of operating performance on governance structures
Variable 2009 2010 2011 All
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 24.304
(3.129)*
28.129
(3.735)*
15.271
(2.828)*
16.151
(2.958)*
2.433
(4.563)
2.861
(5.446)*
31.776
(4.389)*
30.864
(4.331)*
OUD .041
(.439)
.131
(1.387)
-.041
(-.523)
-.042
(-.525)
.088
(1.101)
.109
(1.419)
-.003
(-.060)
1.453
(3.586)*
BSIZE -.094
(-.901)
-.040
(-.396)
-.003
(-.026)
.016
(.153)
-.033
(-.320)
-.026
(-.261)
-.093
(-1.575)
.716
(2.024)*
AUCOM .110
(1.279)
.125
(1.507)
.090
(1.232)
.104
(1.396)
.089
(2.090)**
-.472
(-.939)
BDV .052
(.614)
.111
(1.341)
.153
(2.072)
.167
(2.227)**
.053
(.672)
.125
(1.586)
.150
(3.050)*
.148
(2.998)*
Control 
FMSIZE -.830
(-6.071)*
-.871
(-6.575)*
-1.101
(-8.713)*
-1.108
(-8.661)*
-1.095
(-8.156)*
-1.046
(-7.984)*
-.966
(-12.923)*
-.962
(-13.096)*
LEVE -.012
(-.120)
.016
(.170)
-.068
(-.811)
-.057
(-.663)
.025
(.282)
.019
(.221)
.026
(.499)
.064
(1.237)
BMT -.125
(-1.511)
-.143
(-1.799)***
.055
(.737)
.044
(.576)
.035
(.445)
.018
(.236)
-.031
(-.713)
-.034
(-.815)
BSH -.136
(-1.404)
-.137
(-1447)
.030
(.327)
.034
(.361)
-.055
(-.603)
-.069
(-.786)
-.112
(-2.152)**
-.131
(-2.543)**
MVE .617
(4.993)*
.572
(4.734)*
.958
(8.402)*
.939
(8.064)*
.997
(8.225)*
.873
(7.157)*
.763
(11.420)*
.720
(10.813)*
ROA
t-1
.026
(.317)
-.008
(-.102)
.010
(.139)
.001
(.015)
-.010
(-.121)
-.048
(-.618)
.019
(.440)
.004
(.104)
Note: 1.T Statistics in parenthesis. 
 2. Significance levels are:* P<.01, ** P<.05 and *** P<.10
further confirms the importance of the involvement of more 
women on decision making to corporate performance. 
 However, the regression evidence indicates that the 
effect of board diversity did not strengthen relationship 
between audit committee and ROA. Hence, the result did 
not support the prediction in hypotheses H7. Perhaps, 
this result came out this way because the proportion of 
women on the audit committee which was insignificant 
compared to women on corporate board in general. Other 
than that, for the effect of board diversity to strengthen 
the relationship between audit committee and operating 
performance, the quality of the members that make up the 
committee matters. Accordingly, it must be emphasised that 
the quality and quantity of members that form a gender 
diverse audit committee is essential for having efficient 
and effective audit committee which will exert significant 
impact on corporate performance. Perhaps, the few women 
on the audit committee of FTSE 350 firms did not possess 
requisite financial knowledge, skill and experience to make 
reasonable contribution to the audit committee to enable 
the committee to positively strengthen firm performance. 
This view concurs the argument of Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa (2011) that audit committee with majority financial 
experts may likely to have better approaches in dealing 
with complex financial issues that may arise in the course 
of deliberation than the committee without such experts 
or few number of such experts.
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Although the results were not reported, further analyses 
were carried out to confirm the robustness of the test to the 
model 2 specification in respect of the pooled data. In the 
first place, the dependent variable operating performance 
(ROA) was replaced with market performance. This was 
measured by Tobin Q; and the regression result which 
was not statistically different from the result reported in 
Table 5 indicates that OUD, BSIZE and BDV are significantly 
positively associated with performance. Moreover, the 
effect of board diversity significantly moderates the 
relationship between OUD and performance as well as the 
link between BSIZE and performance. 
 As a further robust check, the 8 dummy variables for 
industry classification which had taken greater part of the 
degree of freedom for the sample size was excluded from 
the model specification to test their effects on operating 
performance. The result from this test was not statistically 
different from result reported in Table 5. As an additional 
test, the 8 sectors in the industry classification were grouped 
into 2 classes1 and included in the model. The regression 
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result of this model is not statistically different from the 
result reported in Table 5. A further robustness analysis was 
conducted by introducing the dummy of year as control 
variables in the model excluding the 8 dummy industry 
variables as well as replacement of 8 dummy variables. 
These tests are statistically similar to the primary result in 
Table 5.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study investigates the relationship between corporate 
governance internal structures and operating performance 
measured as ROA and how this relationship is moderated 
by board diversity. This relationship is as conceptualised 
by the Agency Theory and supported by the Stakeholders 
Theory. The study was motivated by recent policy of the 
UK Government on board diversity, which encourages 
corporate firms to increase women representation on 
corporate boards. 
 In line with the proposition of the Agency theory, 
the results of the study establish a significant positive 
relationship between the proposition of outside directors 
and operating performance. This finding reaffirms previous 
findings on the role of non-executive directors in good 
corporate governance as well as justifies the provision in 
the Governance Corporate Code of UK and some other 
countries which recommend that corporate boards should 
have at least half non-executive directors NEDs. Similarly, 
the study also found board size as well as board diversity 
to be significantly positively correlated with operating 
performance. The result on board diversity is interesting 
because it further clears the doubt about the positive impact 
of the involvement of women on corporate board.
 Furthermore, the findings on integrated model, which 
incorporated the moderating effect of board diversity, 
suggests that the presence of women on corporate board 
(board diversity) plays significant positive interactive 
influence on the relationship between proportion of outside 
directors and operating performance. Added to this, the 
study also indicates that the relationship between board 
size and operating performance is positively moderated by 
the effect of board diversity. However, the effect of board 
TABLE 5. Cross sectional moderated OLS regression of operating performance on governance structures (continued)
Variable 2009 2010 2011 All
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
BMAT -.011
(-.126)
.036
(.436)
.137
(1.860)***
.157
(2.080)**
.186
(2.391)**
.227
(2.977)*
.118
(2.563)**
.146
(3.170)*
CONGOODS -.087
(-.991)
-.047
(-.548)
-.091
(-1.168)
-.074
(-.940)
-.050
(-.620)
-.057
(-.737)
-.069
(-1.472)
-.072
(-1.564)
HCARES .079
(.891)
.025
(.286)
.059
(.802)
.037
(.488)
.105
(1.334)
.022
(.270)
.084
(1.838)***
.044
(.954)
INDUS .182
(1.918)***
.191
(2.065)**
.079
(.943)
.077
(.905)
.124
(1.439)
.086
(1.029)
.137
(2.713)*
.118
(2.366)**
OILGAS -.114
(-1.309)
-.069
(-.814)
-.251
(-3.327)*
-.248
(-3.277)*
.111
(1.417)
.117
(1.555)
-.089
(-1.949)***
-.069
(-1.534)
TELECOM .031
(.398)
.002
(.020)
.025
(.363)
.018
(.265)
.037
(.503)
.033
(.472)
.017
(.409)
.006
(.141)
TECH -.035
(-.389)
-.007
(-.074)
-.180
(-2.159)**
-.164
(-1.913)***
-.169
(-1.938)***
-.159
(-1.908)***
-.072
(-1.475)
-.048
(-1.003)
UTIL .211
(2.394)**
239
(2.806)*
.042
(.554)
.056
(.726)
-.019
(-.235)
.010
(.133)
.092
(2.023)**
.105
(2.335)**
BDV*OUD .166
(1.893)***
.078
(1.096)
.133
(1.721)***
1.454
(3.593)*
BDV*BSIZE .261
(3.175)*
-.092
(-1.253)
.221
(2.908)*
.809
(2.320)**
BDV*AUCOM -.082
(-.011)
.077
(.980)
-.583
(-1.155)
R2 .411 .477 .553 .566 .504 .556 .426 .452
Adjusted R2 .307 .367 .476 .476 .421 .471 .397 .419
F Ratio 3.985
(p=000)
4.336
(p=000)
7.157
(p=000)
6.267
(p=000)
6.043
(p=000)
6.521
(p=000)
14.500
(p=000)
13.687
(p=000)
Notes: 1.T Statistics in parenthesis. 
 2. Significance levels are * P<.01, ** P<.05 and *** P<.10
 3. Regression failed to produce result for BDV*AUCOM in 2011 
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diversity did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between audit committee and operating performance. 
Contrary to the perception that board diversity (women) 
adds no value to firms, findings of this study demonstrate 
that board diversity contributes significantly to corporate 
performance through its interaction on the corporate 
boards. 
 The findings of this study have some notable 
implications. First, the findings clearly demonstrate the 
importance of the interacting influence of board diversity 
on the relationship between the corporate governance 
structures and firm performance; and such influence cannot 
be ignored theoretically. Hence, this suggests that Agency 
Theorists should explicitly support the argument that the 
presence of women on board enhances good corporate 
governance. 
 Furthermore, the findings suggest that policy makers 
in the UK and elsewhere should be more concerned with 
issues surrounding board diversity as well as other related 
issues which could increase good corporate governance. To 
this end, this study’s findings have a number of practical 
implications on UK corporate governance and other 
countries with similar corporate governance principles. 
First, although recently the UK Corporate Governance 
Code was amended to require listed firms to disclose 
in their annual reports diversity of their boards, such 
requirement would have more meaningful impact on 
corporate governance practice. However, it should be 
specific in terms of suggesting minimum number of women 
that should be on the corporate boards as being done for 
nonexecutive and independent directors. 
 Finally, the finding on the marginal relationship 
between audit committee and ROA, makes the need for 
further restructuring of the audit committee particularly 
in the UK in the area of membership and qualification 
imperative. The present requirement that audit committee 
should have at least one member with relevant and 
recent financial experience is loose and inadequate. The 
committee with majority non-financial experts may not 
make any meaningful deliberation and contribution, which 
would have impact on corporate governance as a whole 
and firm performance in particular.
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NOTES
1. The first class consists of basic materials (BMAT), 
consumer goods (CONGOOD), health care service 
(HCARES), utilities (UTIL) while the second class 
comprised of industry (INDUS), oil and gas (OILGAS), 
telecommunication (TELECOM) and technology 
(TECH).
2.  The financial institutions regulated by FSA excluded 
in this study include banks, building societies, 
investment firms, assets managers, insurance 
companies, insurance brokers, credit unit etc.
3.  To centre a variable, the overall mean of the variable 
is deducted from the value of variable.
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